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Cantwell, Mary Zita (M.S. , Labor Relations)
An Evaluation of Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining 
Thesis directed by Professor George W. Zinke
The problem of industry-wide bargaining has only 
recently assumed sizeable proportions in the field of 
labor-raanagement relations. It is the resuit of evolu- 
tionary rather than revolutionary changes in the indus­
trial relations scene.
An historical basis; for industry-wide bargaining 
can be found in the very beginnings of collective bargain­
ing in the United States* As the business enterprise 
increased in size and scope of opérations so the trade 
unions followed this development. The labor movement's 
goal of union security forces unions to control job op- 
portunities and standardize wages and other conditions 
of work at the compétitive product market level» With 
the growth of trade unionism in the 1930’s, the unions 
were able to devote their full energies to the realiza- 
tion of the above goal»
In view of the emphasis on uniformity, which is 
characteristic of industry-wide bargaining, there is 
danger that the local firm will loose its identity and 
the local union will become only an administrative arm 
of the national union. Industry-wide patterns must be 
adapted to the local level because the average industry 
is made up of heterogeneous rather than completely homo- 
geneous firms. In the industrial structure, the firm
is the primary socio-democratic unit; the industry dé­
pends on the firm for its life.
Industry-wide bargaining is not a policy formulat- 
ing device. A tripartite organization should be set-up 
to formulate a framework within which industry-wide nego- 
tiations may be successfully carried on. This authority 
should stand between the governraent and the public. Such 
an organization may not be legislated into existence; 
rather it is the resuit of éducation and experience.
This abstract of about 250 words is approved as to form 
and content. I recoramend its publication.
Signed Instructor in charge of thesis
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS 
Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining has been called
• • • a curious mixture of salesmanship, threats, 
persuasion, face saving, waiting, promotion and 
defense of philosophies for the purpose of making 
some rules governing productive activity.l
The methods of collective bargaining vary from 
union to union? they vary with the structure of the in­
dus try, the nature of the product and its market, the 
history of union-management relationshipa, and so forth. 
Yet despite these individualizing tendencies there is a 
basic common characteristic which may be used to describe 
ail collective bargaining.
How have several economists defined this common 
nature? Hoxie calls collective bargaining a w. • . mode 
of fixing the terms of employment by means of bargaining 
between an organized body of employées and an employer or 
an association of employers, usually acting through duly 
authorized agents” A broader définition states that 
collective bargaining is • • the mutual participation
1 W. V. Owen, ”Objective Attitudes in Collective 
Bargaining,” Personnel Journal, XXV, September, 19U6.
p. 101.
p Robert F. Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United 
States, New York, Appleton & Co.7 1926, p. 263.
of employer and organized employée in the détermination
of their général terme of relationship."^
In the National Labor Relations Aet, collective
bargaining is defined as
• • • the performance of the actual obligation of 
the employer and the représentative of the em­
ployées to meet at reasonable times and confer 
in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the exécution of a written 
contract incorporating anyj agreement reached if 
requested by either party.-*-
This classification is important from the industry-wide 
point of view because of the generality implied in the 
term "other conditions of employment."
Any définition of the collective bargaining procès® 
cannot overlook the fact that the bargain is a dual agree­
ment made by and for both management and labor and also 
that the parties mutually participate in developing the 
contract#
With industry-wide bargaining in mind, collective 
bargaining is called a proceas whereby an employer or an 
association of employers and their association of employ­
ées mutually détermine a contract covering wagea, hours 
of work, and other conditions affecting the employer-
3 Neil Chamberlain, "The Nature and Scope of 
Collective Bargaining," The Quarterly Journal of Econo­
mies, LVIII, May, 1944» P#
^ National Labor Relations Act, sect. 8(d), U.S. 
Stat* at large, vol. 4l, Pt# 1» 1935-1936, p. 449#
employée relationship.
Industry
One of the most illusive concepts in économies 
(and in establishing the nature and extent of industry- 
wide bargaining) is the définition of an "industry.** 
Loosely used in modem parlance the term now has dozens 
of meanings. Yet a particular boundary in its regard is 
essentiel to the labor economist, union leader, and 
management représentative*
Industries are sometimes distinguished on the 
basis of a particular process, such as bookbinding; or 
they may be characterized by the spécifie or generic 
Products they make. Examples of the latter two classifi­
cations are found in the anthracite or bituminuous coal 
mining field or in the automobile industry. Firms are 
also grouped according to spécifie services performed-- 
the railroads or the trucking industry. And in sorne of 
the more complex industries (electrical goods) union 
jurisdiction provides the boundary lines.
One characteristic must certainly be présent in 
any industry regardleas of how it is distinguished; an 
amount of homogeneity among the firms within the group 
is essentiel. No effective or useful organization will 
exist without some product similarity.
An industry of itself has no funetion or use and 
in this characteristic is analogous to society. As a
ksociety dépends foi* its existence , aims, functions, and 
so forth on the individuals comprising it, so an industry 
dépends for its life on the firms included within its 
boundaries.
Albert Meyers calls an industry ”. . .  a group of 
firms producing a homogeneous commodity or a group of 
commodities that are close substitûtes.*’£ This défini­
tion excludes the possibility présent in labor économies 
of two industries producing entirely differentiated 
Products joining forces to prevent employer action which 
they consider disasterous. Also, commodities are spoken 
of in the above classification, but services are not in­
cluded.
Both Bain and Stigler bring out the fact that a 
certain amount of flexibility must be expected among firms 
comprising an industry. Seldom are various plants found 
to be identical in size, type of labor-management rela­
tions, managerial ability, and worker skill and production 
capacity, to mention only a few points. According to 
Bain, an industry is 11. . . a group of products among 
which there /are/ high cross-elasticities of demand but 
which /p-aivej very low . . • cross-elasticities of demand
5 Albert Meyers, Eléments of Modem Economies, rev. 
éd., New York, Prentice Hall, 191+1» p.127*
with ail other produe ts.’*^
An industry, mindful of particular flexibilities, 
is made up of a group of firms whose product(s) and/or 
service(s) are close substitutes and appeal to a common 
group of buyers and are, as a resuit, characterized by 
some compétition.
Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining
While industry-wide collective bargaining has 
existed successfully for a number of years it has only 
recently corne to be an important issue in the field of 
labor-management relations, A clear, uniform définition 
of this division of collective bargaining is seldom to 
be found w. . . the term 'industry-wide bargaining1 must 
be used with a considérable amount of flexibllity* It 
does not lend itself to précisé définition since it can 
be, and has been, applied to différent situations.
In a literal sense, industry-wide collective bar­
gaining is defined as ”, . . collective bargaining bet- 
ween représentatives of the employers and employées in
6 joe S. Bain, Price Theory, New York, Henry Holt 
& Co., 19f?2, p,
George Stigler, The Theory of Price, The Mac- 
millanCo,, New York, 19^7» pp. 2Ü1-2Ü2.
 ^Clyde E. Dankert, Contemporary ïïnionism in the 
United States, New York, Prentice Hall, , p, 2^ 3*
6an industry for the purpose of arriving at a mutually ac-
ceptable agreement to oover ail companies in an industry. 
Shch a définition, though, must be modified to make it 
usefui in a realistic situation» The essence ©f industry- 
wide collective bargaining is still retained even if part, 
usually less than $0 percent, of the labor force and part 
of management are not included in the master agreement. 
Either formai or informai authority may be given unions 
and employers1 associations to speak for their members 
and the bargaining spokesman for the employées or the 
union may represent a single craft ©r a large industrial 
unit. An ever increasing variety of issues are included 
in the negotiations and from the above définition ©f an 
* industry** it is évident that the term may cover a group 
of firms producing similar produets or services.
Industry-wide collective bargaining follows the 
industry and is therefore grouped on a local, régional, 
or national basia. Smyth and Murphy include within their 
définition any bargaining not done on an individual plant 
basis.^ But this is not in keeping with the "industry-
wide** part of the term.
Data which détermine whether or not industry-wide
»8
8 Labor Course, New York, Prentice Hall, 19 8^, 
paragraph 12, p. 12i|.
9 R. C. Smyth and M. J. Murphy, '*Industry-Wide 
Bargaining,** Personnel Journal, XXVI, September 19m-7»
p. 110.
collective bargaining applies, in a given area are classi-
fied both by quantity and quality. Qualitatively the
data are elassified according to products or services*
Since the industry-wide unit rarely includes 100 percent
of the firms in an industry such a classification is too
rigid* Xt rnust be modified by a quantitative review of
the data— some percentage, usually more than $0 percent,
of the firms have to be included in the bargaining unit*
Professor Pierson* s définition of industry-wide
collective bargaining is most logical in view of the
"imperfect" nature of the industry structure.
Bargaining is on an industry-wide basis when 
negotiations over one or more issues are con- 
ducted by two negotiating bodies, one of which 
on the worker's side représenta, either by 
formai or informai authorization, a majority 
of ail employées within an industry, or a 
majority of ail employées in a particular 
category or work, and the other of which on 
the employer*s side represents, either by 
formai or informai authorization, a majoritv 
of ail the firms or plants in the industry*
The terns”industry-wide bargaining" and "industry-wide
collective bargaining" are understood to have the same
meaning*
Pattern Bargaining and ünion-Wide Bargaining
Two types of collective bargaining which, while
10 Frank C. Pierson, Multi-Employer Bargaining, 
Nature and Scope, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 191+8» P» 9»
8producing results sirailar to those of industry-wide 
bargaining, do not fall into this category are pattern 
bargaining and union-wide bargaining. Either of these 
types of bargaining frequently leads to industry-wide
bargaining.
In pattern bargaining the union bargains first 
with the most influential, usually the largest, firm in 
the industry and then uses the resulting agreement as a 
pattern in negotiations with the other firms. Pattern 
bargaining is the practice in the steel industry; United 
States Steel Corporation is considered the pace-setter. 
This type of negotiation approaches industry-wide bargain­
ing on an informai, narrow basis.H
Union-wide bargaining exists where a single union 
bargains with a number of differentiated producers over 
a wide area made-up of one or more employer associations. 
The teamsters' union offers an excellent example of this 
variety of collective bargaining.
Other Divisions of Multi-Employer Bargaining
Industry-wide bargaining is one division of multi- 
employer bargaining. Two others, régional and local area 
bargaining, were mentioned above. They and one other 
form of such bargaining deserve mention.
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
•'Collective Bargaining with Associations and Grougs of 
Employérs7Tr bulT W F T  Wash., D. C., Government Printing
Office;'”Ï9U7, p. 9.
9As the terms imply, local and régional collective 
bargaining are types of negotiations carried on between 
a union and an association of employers on either a city 
or an area level. Local multi—employer bargaining existS; 
where the compétitive area and/or the majority of firms 
are limited to a spécifie coramunity. Multi-employer 
bargaining on a régional level is fitted to an industry 
if the location of the firms, the compétitive area, the 
problems of the laborers and of management ail fall in a
given région.
Company-wide bargaining exists where large multi- 
plant corporations are found. This is truly the fore-
runner of présent industry-wide bargaining. Even without\ :
the irapetus given by unions and government, labor rela­
tions would be company-wide simply because of the pressure 
of large business organizations on the labor movement.
CHAPTER II
THE EVOLUTION OP INDUSTRY-WIDE BARGAINING 
Introduction
Before embarking on the considération of the de­
velopment of industry-wide bargaining two things should 
be borne in mind regarding trade union policies:
1) union theory is not a definitely stated body of ideasj 
rather, as union activity, it follows an opportunistic 
course; and 2) the union should not be thought of as a 
bargaining agent concerned with reducing hours, raising 
wages, and improving working conditions— unions are social 
as well as économie organizations.
Pour distinct characteristics are évident in any 
type of collective bargaining. The first may be ealled 
a theory of standardization--wages and conditions of em- 
ployment are determined by the bargaining strength of 
the two parties, management and the union. The bargain­
ing strength of the employer is always greater than that 
of the individual worker because of such factors as 
superior knowledge, a lesser thing at stake (life for 
the worker as compared to profit for the employer), and 
a potential over-supply of labor. As long as individual 
or compétitive bargaining persista it tends to drive down 
wage standards and conditions of work. This détériora­
tion may be overcome only through worker combinations 
to bargain on an equal level with employers.
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The second theory refers to definite standards of 
work and pay. The employer is constantly trying to re- 
introduce individual bargaining and to drive down wages 
and standards j often through methods of such subtility 
as to pass by the imperceptive worker. Collective 
bargaining leads to clear spécifications of conditions 
of work and so offsets the individual worker's lack of 
knowledge and the weakness of his bargaining position 
against that of the employer.
Thirdly, collective bargaining is bénéficiai to 
the employer. The union claims that such procédures will 
increase the supply of skilled labor available to the em­
ployer. Collective bargaining will also increase the 
efficiency of the work force, will stabilize the work 
front, and, if ail employers in an industry are organized, 
it will reduce compétitive wage cutting.
Lastly, collective bargaining may give rise to a 
double sided monopoly which from a purely theoretical 
point of view is advantageous both to the union and to 
management.'*'
The history of trade unionism and that of collec­
tive bargaining are closely related for collective bar­
gaining is one of the major reasons for the existence of 
trade unions. Randle suggests the following conclusions
 ^Robert P. Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United 
States, New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1919» PP» 2^6-200.
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which may be drawn regarding the évolution of collective 
bargaining.
la Collective bargaining is one of our oldest
économie institutions— predating the business 
corporation.
2. • • » ——
3* Collective bargaining has been steadily grow- 
ing in terms of expansiveness and pénétration 
as evidenced by
a. increase in the nuraber of bargaining units 
and employées represented
b. extension of collective bargaining into 
industrial areas of the South, into small 
cities and towns, and into mass production 
industries
c. représentation of a greater range of skills 
spreading from skilled to semi-skilled and 
white collar workers
d. extension of the area of bargaining from 
plant-wide, to city-wide, to region-wide, 
and finally to industry-wide.
Yet despite its historically proven antiquity, 
collective bargaining is regarded by many as a modem in­
stitution. Probably the new-old view of collective bar­
gaining lies in its discontinuous use. Collective bargain­
ing is inséparable from trade unionism, which was itself 
an unstable institution until the 1890*s. Neither the 
employer nor the worker could learn to use collective 
bargaining until stable trade unionism developed and 
unions became a recognized American institution.
The interested reader is confronted with a tremen- 
dous variation in the place and time of practice in the
2 C. Wilson Randle, Collective Bargaining—  
Principles and Practices, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 
19ü>l» P.
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industries using collective bargaining. In the older 
industrial centers, New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, 
it was in général use by the early 1800's. The printers 
and cordwainers were among the earllest unions to advo- 
cate joint settlement of wages, hours, and working condi­
tions. It sprang up as an industrial practice in other 
coramunities where, because the bargaining lacked connec­
tion with previously established Systems, it was thought 
to be a new industrial relations technique.
The important influence of diverse local factors 
should not be overlooked in the success, fallure, or non- 
existence of collective bargaining attempts. Municipal 
politicians, with an eye to the labor vote, at times gave 
collective bargaining a "push.” Adverse or favorable 
court décisions had their effects, too. Public opinion, 
the press, and the popularity and strength of labor 
leaders complété the list of important local influences.
A third factor giving rise to what Chamberlain 
calls a "bifocalM3 view of trade unionism was changes in 
the structure of trade unionism and business enterprlses. 
The original unions were developed along craft lines on 
a latéral basis corresponding to the local markets served 
by most early business enterprlses. As industry expanded 
and covered a national market, so did trade unionism be- 
come national in scope. Finally, the development of the
3 Neil Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining, New 
York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951, p. 2.
mass production industry led to the success of the indus­
trial type union. The tremendous impetus given to indus­
trial unionism in the 1930* s gave a feeling of ,,newM 
collective bargaining actually corresponding to the new 
type of union structure.
Collective bargaining may be called an ”agreement 
between management and the union on the général terms 
under which the worker would consent to work.Before 
1900 these agreements just covered wages and hours, but 
since the turn of the century the scope of the bargain 
has been ever increasing.
Industry-Wide Bargaining Prior to the 1930*s
Industry-wide bargaining existed in some industries 
before the 1930*s but it was not a widespread industrial 
practice nor did it receive much attention from unions 
or management. For the unions were attempting, during 
this period, to secure a permanent place in the industrial 
scene.
With the growth of trade unionism in the 1930*s, 
and aided by favorable government poliey, the unions 
could concentrate ©n a goal which had been évident 
throughout the évolution of the labor movement, namely, 
a standardisation of wages and other conditions of work. 
The union wanted to take labor out of compétition. Such
11+
^ Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 3.
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an aim called for control of the job opportunities and 
the labor force over the compétitive product market area.
In the face of the national mass production industries 
which are an American characteristic, industry-wide bargain­
ing was inévitable. The union could match the strength of 
management only on the industry-wide level.
For detailed discussion of the events in labor 
history prior to the 1930's many excellent labor historiés 
are available.^
Labor, Bargaining, and the New Deal
Background
As regards industry-wide bargaining, the period 
beginning with the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
in 1932 was the most important in the history of the labor 
movement. A short survey of the period immediately pre- 
ceding the 1930's will serve to emphasize the importance 
of labor*s New Deal.
Labor up to this time had advocated a traditional 
(from the Gomper*s era beginning in the late 1890*3) policy 
of independence. By means of coercive pressure on employ- 
ers labor fought for union récognition and the right of
^ John R. Commons and Associates, History of Labor 
in the United States, vols., New York, The MacmTTlan 
co., 1935T
Selig Perlman, A History of Trade Unionism in the 
United States, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1937»
George W. Zinke, History of Labor Management Re­
lations in the United States, Boulder, Colo., University 
of Colorado, 19^8.
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collective bargaining, The main goal of the labor move- 
ment being an increase in bargaining power, labor parochia- 
lism permitted no broad social and/or économie factors to
temper its program.
During World War I, the National War Labor Board I 
protected labor against employer discrimination, but re- 
fused to enforce the closed shop in industry. The fédéral 
protection policy lasted for the duration of the conflict 
and then gave way before anti-union employers.
During the 1920's labor lost ground in its organi­
sation drives. The following reasons may be noted for 
labor1s lack of success in an era of increasing technolo- 
gical advance.^ The dépréssion of 1920-21 wiped out almost 
half of labor's wartime gains. The technological innova­
tions occurring during this period tended to minimize 
skills. The A*F. of L. was essentially a craft organisa­
tion and was unable and unwilling to adapt its structure 
to include the masses of unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
employéd by large industries;. Industrial prosperity, high 
wages, and a farm dépréssion increased the workers' real 
wages and their living standards were improving. The 
laborers had little incentive to join a union. As large 
mass production factories developed, a trend toward con­
centration of ownership as well as concentration of pro­
duction was visible. Labor was not strong enough to
6 Harold W. Metz and Meyer Jacobstein, A National 
Labor Policy, Wash., D. C., The Brookings Instituts, 191+7» 
pp.Ii.-7l
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battle successfully with the powerful industrial trusta. 
Management embarked on an anti-union campaign consisting 
of the older militant techniques in addition to the newly 
discovered welfare relations# These swift and startling 
developments on the industrial front put labor on the dé­
fensive and reduced its organizing abilities# Between 
1923 and 193b ln ©nly two years did unions increase their 
membership, while in other years they suffered significant 
losses.
One of the effects of the dépréssion of the 1930’s 
was a lowering of the général standard of living as well 
às increasing uneraployment• It has been estimated that 
unemployment in 1933 rose t© sixteen million.? Such ex­
trême économie changes were bound to effect the attitudes 
of the workers, the intellectual climate in which unionism 
operated as well as the government poliey toward trade 
unions, and to contribute to trade union expansion.
The wage earners, driven by a sense of desperation 
were more prone t© assert a positive right to participât© 
in the détermination of the terms and conditions of em- 
ployment through concerted action and collective bargain­
ing by représentatives ©f their own choosing. Public 
opinion became more favorable toward union activity. The 
average middle-class citizen looked with greater tolérance
 ^Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, Labor*s 
Risks and Social Insurance. Vol. II, The Economies of Labor, 
New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 193&» P* l8*
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on the objectives of organized labor. He became less dis- 
posed to regard the appearance ©f "collective bargaining"
û
and "job control" as "unwarranted and pernicious" in­
trusions into the économie system.
The fédéral government for the firat time took a 
positive attitude toward organized labor. The character- 
istics ©f this attitude were evidenced in
. • • enaetments freeing . . .  organized labor 
from the ravages of the injunction, elucidating 
the wage earners1 old right to organize and 
bargain collectively through représentatives 
of their own choosing, rendering this right 
real and dynamic by prohibiting such practices 
and acts on the part of employers as had in the 
past often made it merely a nominal right, and 
providing for governmental assistance in the 
détermination of unita appropriate for collec­
tive bargaining and in the sélection of bargain­
ing représentatives.9
Characteristics of trade unionism of the 1930* s
The following factors are noteworthy as being 
peculiar to trade unionism of the New Deal era. First, 
a rapid décliné in company unions was évident after 1937; 
trade unions once again were able t© establish collective 
bargaining. Secondly, the rising importance of industrial 
and semi-industrial unions was an outstanding characteris­
tic of the period. Finally, collective bargaining was 
established to a wider degree than ever before. In the
8 Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, Organized 
Labor, Vol. III, The Economies of Labor, New York, McGraw- 
Hill Book Co., Inc., 19i|5, p • 189.
 ^Millis and Montgomery, op. cit., p. 191.
1920's, collective bargaining was limited to a few in­
dustries, but by 19U0 it had become established to some 
extent in almost every branch of industry. The expansion 
of collective bargaining to almost every segment of the 
industrial economy went hand-in-hand with the spread of 
unionism from urban centers into raiddle sized and small 
manufacturing eommunities, where, before the 1930*3» it 
could not have developed. The tendency of collective 
agreements to cover a wider géographie area was also évi­
dent.
The labor movement of the 1930*s bears little 
apparent relationship to the stagnant labor group of the 
preceding decade. In the 1930*s tremendous increases in 
membership were brought about by the expansion of existing 
unions and the création of new ones. An industrial union 
movement appeared among the mass production workers, 
tapping a source ignored in the 1920's. Not only were 
the industrial workers organized, but collective bargain­
ing became the established method ©f union-management 
dealings.
Labor of the later decade was infused with a new 
militancy which enabled it to obtain the above mentioned 
advances. At the same time, labor organizations necessar- 
ily under the depressed économie conditions, looked t© 
the state for more and more protection, in the form of 
législation, and unions evidenced an increased interest 
in political action.
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Factors basic to the fédéral labor program of the 19301s 
Before any definite labor poliey was formulated 
by the goverament, several basie factors regarding union­
ism had to be considered. The following factors were 
basic to the government program formulated in the 1930’s.'®’® 
1* Labor unions perform a needed function.
2. Restrictive labor practices are undesirable*
3. Collective bargaining should be between employ- 
ers and workers in spécifie industries.
I4.. Labor conflicts should not be extended to in­
jure innocent third parties.
$ . Peaceful settlement of industrial disputes 
should be facilitated.
Légal settlng for the New Deal program
The judicial décisions of any âge are seen as re-
flections of the thinking of the significant group in a
society. Prior to 1930» American society was characteriz- 
ed by its emphasis upon "rugged individualism.” In this 
view point trade unions were apparently considered as 
barriers to "individual freedom.” The judicial formula 
curbing unionism, until 1932, also reflected the opposi­
tion of organized industry. The Norris-LaGuardia Act 
might be set as the dividing line separating this prior 
emphasis and a new emphasis on the protection of the right 
of the individual to express himself through organisation
in the form of trade unionism.
xo Metz and Jacobstein, op. cit., pp. $$-66.
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This change of emphasis; was a logical évolution of 
social thinking. For unions in the early l800's were in­
novations and thus posed problems which were difficult 
to résolve with the existing légal equipment. Most of 
the judges of the time were acting in good faith and their 
reasoning, if outmoded, was in the social interest»
The confusion characteristic of labor législation 
in America was evidence ©f society's adjustment to chang- 
ing social and économie conditions. For prior to 1932 
there occurred a tremendous expansion of the industrial 
society which required drastic changes in social attitudes» 
The spread of union activity was one evidence of this ad­
justment. Justice Holmes proved an able prophet when, in 
1896, he wrote in a dissenting opinions
» • • the organization of the world, now going 
on so fast, means an ever increasing might and 
scope of combination. It seems to me futile to 
set our faces against this tendency.ll
Chamberlain concludes:
When social ^orce7 on which ail law is 
rested is in a state of change, it is not sur- 
prising if judicial opinion reflects Personal 
conceptions of the requirements of the chang- 
ing social order and if they should show in 
varying degrees a cautious reluctance to de- 
part too swiftly from past principles when 
the conséquences of departure remain uncertain. ^
11 Vegelahan v. Guntner, 167 Mass. N.E. 
1077 (189677^
12 Chamberlain, oj>. cit., p. 297»
22
Fédéral labor législation in tbe 1930* s
To understand the development of labor législation 
in the 1930*3 it is necessary to conslder the Railway 
Labor Act of 1926,
Railway Labor Act » 1926» The Railway Labor Act is 
technically the first fédéral law protecting the right of 
labor to organize. But the extent ©f its coverage is 
narrowed to one industry.
The Act was the resuit of the poor labor-management 
conditions which prevailed in the railroad industry after 
World War I. Enforcement of the law was assured by the 
establishment of the National Médiation Board. The Board 
was staffed by three full time members. Management and 
the union were instructed to make every effort to bargain 
collectively. The union could negotiate through a repré­
sentative of its own choosing. The original law pro- 
hibited the elosed shop.
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 1932. The second fédéral 
law aimed at protecting trade unions, set-up restrictive 
qualifications under which the fédéral courts could issue 
injunctions, or virtually banned the use of an injunction 
against a union. It also declared the yellow-dog contract 
unenforceable in the fédéral courts. Thus for the first 
time, labor found itself on an equal footing with manage­
ment in being able to apply coercive techniques t© obtain 
its économie goals.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act represented the first
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déclaration by Congress of a particular poliey wlth re­
spect to collective bargaining in ail cases coming within 
the jurisdiction of the fédéral courts. The workers were 
guaranteed the right to organize without management1 s 
interférence. But while the principle of collective bar­
gaining was recognized, the employers were under no obli­
gation to negotiate with the workers.
National Industrial Recovery Act, 1933. When labor 
asked for a thirty-hour work week bill in the early 1930*s 
as a •’spread-the-work1’ measure, it was necessary for labor 
to ask the help of the government. The shorter work week 
bill was not fortheoming, but the government passed the 
N.I.R.A. which included some provisions for labor.^
Section 7(&) which protected the workers’ right 
to organize and bargain collectively through représenta­
tives of their ©wn choosing, was the most significant 
part of the Act as far as labor was eoneerned.
Collective bargaining was recognized as a method 
of achieving industrial peace. And the obligation of the 
employer to bargain collectively was established mainly 
in the administrative décisions of the various labor 
boards, none of which were eompletely effective. Their 
ineffectivenesa was a resuit of their limited power t© 
enforce décisions and the subséquent disregard of same 
by both labor and management.
Black Thirty-hour-week Bill
2k
The unions, therefore, were entitled to a free existence, 
but any advances were t© be made on their own. Despite 
defects of the N.I.R.A., trade union membership in the 
A.P. of L. increased by 800,000 between June 1933 and June 
1935» Signifying coming developments, this membership 
growth occurred only in firms which were already organized.
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act). 1935»
The Wagner Act, which has been called labor's basic charter, 
was passed by Congress in 1935 as a substitut© for the 
N.I.R.A. which had been declared unconstitutional by the 
Suprême Court.^ The N.L.R.A. itself was not effective 
until its constitutionality was established by the same 
court in 1937*^
Unionization and collective bargaining were pro- 
moted by the Act on the basis of attaining the two follow- 
ing objectives: 1) the strengthening of collective bar­
gaining which would furnish uninterrupted opération of 
Interstate commerce, and 2) the advancement of the nation1s 
économie welfare as labor is able to secure a large share 
of the national income.
The Act Included most of section 7(a) of the N.I.R.A., 
but als© incorporated a number of unfair employer practices. 
Company-dominated unions became illégal and the existing
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. et al v. US, 295 
US k90 (1935T.
^  NLRB v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US 1
(1937).
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organizations became nuclei for new unions.
The Wagner Act made no effort to disguise its pro-
labor formula. For the first time in American labor
history collective bargaining was enforced as a matter of
public policy.
Caught in the labyrinth of modem industrialism 
and dwarfed by the size of the corporate enter- 
prise, he /the worker/ can attain freedom and 
dignity only by coopération with others of his 
group.lo
This view of the increasing importance of group action 
had been slowly evolving since Justice Holmes1 dissent in 
Vegelahan v. Guntner.
The impact of the Act on trade union membership 
was tremendous? the Machinists grew from 70,000 in 1933 
to 210,000 in 1937» the Electrical Workers from 85,500 in 
1933 t© 171,000 in 1937» and the Hôtel and Restaurant Em­
ployées jumped from 25,000 to 107,000 membera.^
From this point on, the trade unions would fight, 
not for acceptance ©f trade unionism and collective bar­
gaining, but for the extension of the scope and géographie 
coverage of the bargain.
The National Labor Relations Board was established 
to administer the N.L.R.A. The Board was given adéquate 
authority to enforce its décisions, which authority made
1 Wagner, Congressional Record, May 15, 1935» 
quoted in Chamberlain, ©£. cit., p. 301.
^  Randle, ojo. cit., p. 35»
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the Board more effective than its predecessors under the 
N.I.B.A.
In determining the bargaining unit, the Board hasi 
fréquently found for the industry-wide or multi-employer 
unit. Because of political repercussions, though, the 
N.L.R.B. has established rigid spécifications to be ful- 
filled before the larger unit is allowed. In the Alpena 
Garment Company case the Board’s poliey regarding industry- 
wide or multi-employer units reads:
The integrated nature of the business of 
the Company, the similarity of the work at the 
various plants, the dependence of ail plants upon 
the main plant, and the centralisation of the 
management of the plants convince us the employ­
er -unit basis upon which the plants have been 
organized will best effectuate collective bar­
gaining between the company and its employées.*®
The N.L.R.B. is discussed more fully under the section of
the Taft-Hartley Act.
The Formation of the C.1.0.
What happened to the union movement, to the whole 
economy in fact, as a resuit of the rapid about face which 
occurred in government labor poliey? The split in the 
labor movement will be more sensible if viewed in the 
light of the new rôle of unionism and collective bargain­
ing resulting from the drastic législative changes.
Before 1932 the union was ignored by the govern­
ment and the public and both ignored and fought by
1 fi Alpena Garment Co., 13 NLRB 72l*
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management* Collective bargaining existed at the consent 
of the employer, and the union was an independent, isolated 
organization. After 1932, management had to recognize the 
union and bargain collectively with it. Par from being 
the forgotten group, the labor movement was strongly pro- 
tected by government législation.
As an organization the A.P. of L. was not prepared 
for such a drastic révolution and it increasingly proved 
itself unable to adjust to the novel developments. For 
the A.P. of L. was primarily composed of craft groups each 
of which jealously guarded its ©wn autonomy. The craft 
workers, too, were engaged in a ,flast ditehM attempt to 
preserve their skills in the face of increasing mechaniza- 
tion of industry. Literally thousands of workers in the 
important mass production industries were unorganized.
And while the Fédération authorized charters in a number 
of these industries the following statement made at the 
A.P. ©f L. convention in 1934 was indicative of the spirit 
of the organization. The Fédération has a "duty t© formu­
lât© policies which will fully protect the jurisdictional 
rights ©f ail trade unions organized on craft lines.”-^
Because of a failure to organize along industrial 
lines, the summer ©f 1935 saw trade union gains of 1933 
and 1934 rapidly disappearing. A Committee for Industrial 
Organization was established in the A.p. ©f L. in 1935»
A.P. of L., Proceedings, 1934» PP* 5^6
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but the faction became too strong and was expelled in 
1937* In 1938» Committee for Industrial Organization be­
came the Congress of Industrial Organizations.
The CIO unions were of the industrial type 
• . • The mere fact that a person was employed 
in a certain industry made him eligible for 
membership. No particular skill was necessary. 
This provision is of especial significance be- 
cause it served as a vehicle by means of which 
the great mass of workers could carry their 
collective bargaining ambitions to fruition.
It also complicated bargaining, for a hetero- 
geneous range of skills was présent with vary- 
ing wage rates and varying working conditions.
In contrast with the craft union, the bargain­
ing difficulties in the industrial union arose 
from diversity of skills rather than from di- 
versity of industries. In one sense, however, 
industrial unionism simplified bargaining for 
the employer. If he had a plant /with/ a 
number of AFL craft unions, he might have 
several différent contracts, terminating at 
several différent times, and the workers might 
be represented through as many as ten or fif- 
teen différent unions. But if the CIO had 
organized the plant, one union and one con­
tract would suffice . . .  Under the CIO, ail 
workers could be organized. The birth of the 
CIO thus changed the complexion of collective 
bargaining both in terms of philosophy of 
unionism and in terms of the actual mechanicsof bargaining.20
World War II
As in the first World War, though on a much larger 
scale, the World War II period witnessed a drastic in- 
crease in économie activity. Cost-plus contracts enabled 
labor to secure its demands with comparative ease. Bet- 
ween 191+2 and 19b5> union membership grew at the rate of
Randle, op. cit.. pp. 38-39»
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almost one million a year.^l
The participation of labor on many of the war emer- 
gency boards with delegates from the business and public 
fronts gave evidence of the increasing stature of the 
labor movement*
The National War Labor Board
The N.W.L.B. was created by the Président in January 
I9I4.2. It was a substituts for the National Defense Média­
tion Board which was unable to cope with the increased 
number of strikes. The N.W.L.B. had authority to settle 
industrial disputes and administer the Wage Stabilization 
Program*
A set of ,,patternn décisions for given situations 
was soon developed by the Board. These patterns became 
recognized by the unions. If a union was receiving less 
than the pattern allowed, it created a labor dispute, the 
issue was referred to the Board, and the union1 s standards: 
were increased to ••normal.”
To facilitate the handling of its work, increase 
production efficiency, and achieve the idéal in material 
and labor allocation, the Board tended toward an industry- 
wide poliey and favored industry-wide bargaining units.
This tendency carried over into the post-war scenej but 
it was not a new method of industrial relations, rather
21 Ibid., p. ij.1.
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the M. • • adoption of the observed historical trend to- 
wards industry-wide and area-wide collective bargaining."22
The Taft-Hartley Act and Industry-Wide Bargaining 
Background
In the various législative proposais during the 
ten year intérim, the dissatisfaction with the Wagner Act 
was- évident. Millis and Brown establish three crucial 
periods in the législative development of the Taft-Hartley 
Act.2^
1) The 76th Congress, (1939-191+0) » In the period 
directly following the Suprême Court's déclaration of the 
constitutionality of the Wagner Act numerous policier 
were formulated by management political action groups*
This was a period of adjustment and groping.
2) The Smith-Connelly Act (passed during the 191+3 
session of the 7Ôth Congress). This Act established a 
thirty day notice period before a union could call a strike. 
At the end of the thirty day period the N.L.B.B. would 
hold a plant élection to détermine whether or not the em­
ployées wanted to strike* The Bill further established
the statutory authority of the War Labor Board. Strikes
Zinke, o£. cit., p. 210.
23 Harry A. Millis and Emily C. Brown, From the 
Wagner Act to the Taft-Hartley, Chicago, The University 
of Chicago Press, 1950» P* 3l+&*
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in government held plants and mines were prohibited.
Unions were to make no political contributions in fédéral 
élections. Most of these proposais are recognizable by 
virtue of their inclusion in the Taft-Hartley Act.
3) The 79th Congress, (19il.5-19i.l6). Many minor 
bills were introduced in this session of Congress which 
exercised a direct effect on the provisions of the Taft- 
Hartley Act. The first ©f these, the McMahon Bill, called 
for the establishment of a conciliation and arbitration 
service on the national level by the fédéral government.
The Ellender Bill was introduced at the recommendation of 
Président Truman following the Labor-Management Conférence,
0
similar to Président Wilson’s 1919 Labor-Management Con­
férence. The Bill provided for the establishment of fact 
finding boards. Provision for a Fédéral Industrial Re­
lations Board was contained in the Ball-Hatch Bill, a di- 
luted version of the Ball-Burton-Hatch Bill. The Board 
was to be concerned only with médiation and voluntary 
arbitration, and fact finding. It was able to pétition 
for injunctions within the acope of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act. The Smith Bill included the provisions of the Ball- 
Hatch Bill, but went several steps further. It was con­
cerned with union organization, the internai opérations 
of the union, and also with the prohibition and/or restric­
tion of spécifie types of strikes, boycotts, and other 
union means of économie coercion.
The Case Proposais are beat summarized as followsï
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1) established a Fédéral Médiation Board; 2) called for 
a 60-day "cooling-off" period before a strike; 3) set up 
enforcement provisions for the "cooling-off" period; Ij.) 
established a fact finding commission; £) designated 
heavy penalties for those interfering with Interstate 
commerce; 6) regulated union and company welfare funds;
7) excluded "supervis or s1 from the définition of "employée" 
used in the Wagner Act; 8) allowed damage suits to be 
filed against unions for contract violations; 9) deprived 
the union of benefits allowed under the Wagner Act if it 
violated the provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement; and 10) outlawed secondary boycotts by re- 
employing the anti-trust laws against the union.
Few major proposais of the Taft-Hartley Act are not 
found in the législative proposais of this period. A 
militant minority of senators and représentatives constant- 
ly proposed amendments to change the Wagner Act during the 
period 1937-19^7* The views of the minority finally be- 
came the accepted outlook of Congress. 2k Yet in spite of 
the lengthy hearings, Congress never undertook or authori- 
zed a systematic, non-political study of the labor-manage- 
ment scene before enacting a law goveming opérations in 
this field.
The Taft-Hartley Act and direct Congressional influence
2i| ,Ibid., p. 362.
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The Senate Commtttee on Labor and Public Welfare 
recommended the following provisions be included in any 
labor législation passed during the sessions of the 80th 
Congress :
1. making union interférence with or coercion of 
employées in the exercise of their rights to 
join or not to join a union an unfair labor 
practice
2. important restrictions on industry-wide bargain- 
ing
3. heavy restrictions on welfare funds
l^.. allowing direct action against jurisdictional 
strikes and secondary boycotts through the use 
of injunctions
These provisions were incorporated in the Taft Bill.
During the floor debates on the Taft Bill the 
amendment restricting industry-wide bargaining was reject- 
ed. While the debates in the Senate were far from adé­
quate, they were on a much higher plane than those in the 
House. Some attempt was made in the Senate to get to the 
basic Issues involved and fit the law to these issues.
The major différence between the House and Senate 
bills as they were passed rested on the fact that the 
former put heavy restrictions on industry-wide bargaining. 
This provision was later rejected by the conférence com- 
mittee.
Just what basic concessions did the Hbuse con­
férées maket We conceded on the ban of our bill 
on industry-wide bargaining • . . . We conceded 
on the question of injunctions to be ordained by
3k
private employer® and on the provisions making 
labor organizations subject to the anti-trust 
laws.25
The Taft-Hartley Act a3; a whole
The Taft-Hartley Act présents, to some extent, in­
terférence with collective bargaining. The "permanence
26and stability in collective bargaining suffered" as a 
resuit ©f the important rôle given to dissenting groupa 
and minorities. Craft and pseudo-craft units were en- 
couraged to the détriment of industry-wide bargaining 
units. Many of the provisions of the Act refiected a new 
emphasis on individual bargaining and an apparent distrust 
of collective bargaining, especially industry-wide.
The reemphasds on individual bargaining is evi- 
denced in the free speech clause of the Act* Also it is 
évident in the newly articulated unfair labor practices. 
Some critics of the Act advance the theory that the latter 
section gives the government too much control over indus­
trial relations, control better left t© the union and 
management to work out among themselves. Still these 
critics are those advocating industry-wide bargaining and 
under such circurastances, in the light of past experience, 
Controls of this nature cannot be left entirely to the
Hartley, Daily Congressional Record: 93î6£i4-0, 
quoted by Millis and Brown, op. cit., p. 386.
Millis and Brown, op. cit., p. 660.
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discrétion of labor and management. The government, it 
should be remembered, représenta the people.
The increased rôle of the government in industrial 
relations whieh the Act established, extended the ”shadow!1 
of the government over the bargaining table and impeded 
the free action of collective bargaining. Those eontinu- 
ing collective bargaining relationships took on a "boot- 
legl,27 attitude toward bargaining arrangements, trying to 
continue an old, satisfactory agreement in the light of 
new rules. The closed shop issue, particularly in the 
building trades, was a typical case. By advocating craft 
units, the Taft-Hartley Act encouraged rival unionism and 
brought a feeling of instability to existing collective 
bargaining agreements where a craft unit was a possibili-
ty.
The Act placed a temporary hait on attempts to ex- 
tend union organization to unorganized areas. The in­
dus try-wi de organization was weakened at the expense of 
protecting individual rights. In some instances the Act 
had an adverse effect on the increase of individual 
rights. Because of the uncertainties conneeted with col­
lective activity under the new law, many national unions 
tightened control over the locals. Centraiization of 
strikes, boycotts, and the like were surprising and un- 
expected results.
Millis and Brown, ©£. cit.. p. 639.
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Effects of particular provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act 
on I-WB
Authority to détermine the bargaining unit. Both 
the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act left the détermina­
tion of the industry-wide bargaining unit to the authori­
ty of the N.L.R.B., subject to review by the courts.
Yet under Taft-Hartley preference no longer re- 
sided in the larger unit. If a craft or other homogeneous 
group of employées within the larger unit desired a différ­
ent union, the Board moved to set up such a union. Section 
9(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act on raulti-employer units reads 
"to assure to employées fullest freedom in exercising 
their rights guaranteed by the Act," while the Wagner Act 
wants to "insure to employées the full benefit of their 
right to self-organization and to collective bargaining 
and otherwise to effectuate the purposes of this Act."^®
The revised section 9(b) was aimed in part to 
break-up union job control and reduce possibilities of 
labor monopoly.
New status given craft and professional units.
This provision indicated the détermination of Congress 
that the freedom of the smaller groups of workers to se­
lect their own bargaining représentative was to be in- 
sured even though past industry experience had been t© 
the contrary and at the expense of industry-wide
Labor Management Relations Act, section 9(b). 
National Labor Relations Act, section 9(b).
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bargaining. Section 9(b) was designed to balance the 
status of the individual worker and small group of work­
ers against the large national union.
In the case of the Link Belt Company v. Internation­
al Moulders and Foundry Workers ^  this protection was évi­
dent. The pattern workers had worked closely with the 
other employées; and had been included in the large bar­
gaining unit. A Board décision made the pattern workers 
an indépendant bargaining group. The practice of carving 
craft units out of established industry-wide units was: 
©pposed by management as well as the union.
Provision for action in a national emergency. This 
section gave additional evidence of Congress’ détermina­
tion to secure individual bargaining rights. The pro­
visions for a vote of the employées of Heach employer” on 
whether they would accept the final offer made, could be 
used to break-down industry-wide bargaining. This part 
of the section is no longer of great importance since it 
was found that employées were generally loyal to the union 
in the last analysis.
Unfair labor practices. Millis and Brown adéquate- 
ly sum up the effect of this section of the Act on in­
dustry-wide bargaining as followsî
• . • extensive restrictions and limitations 
meant an interférence with the freedom of the
29 21 LRM 1201 (191+8)
38
collective bargaining process at many points, 
adding uncertainty, confusion and instability, 
contrary to the spirit of a free collective 
bargain which we believe to be the better 
road for the solution of industrial relations problems.30
Effect on industry-wide bargaining and market re- 
straints. The sections dealing with market restraints 
/B’fb)([).) and 303(&Jl7 wer® direct results of the Allen 
Bradley case*31 Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, the 
courts held that the union's action did not have any 
bearing on the union1s conduct except in the particular 
case where it joined in a conspiracy with a group of em- 
ployers or a single employer, In U.S. v. International 
Hod C a r r i e r the court permitted the union to stop 
technological advances. While in the U.S. v. Building 
and Construction Trades Councll c a s e83 the union was 
able to prevent the use of cheaper building materlais* 
Section 8(b)(i|.) classified any secondary boycott 
as an unfair labor practice, while section 303(a) held 
that an individual injured by a secondary boycott could 
sue for damages, To some extent this section revlsed 
the old Bedford Cut Stone and Duplex doctrines.
30 Millis and Brown, o£. cit,, p. l|.8l,
31 Allen Bradley Co, v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW,
325 u.s. 79TTT9I+5 ). “
32 313 U.S. 539 (19i|l)
33 313 U.S. 539 (!9iA)
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Actually labor union activities under the old doctrines
were free from challenge only insofar as they were con-
cerned with the workers1 immédiate employer»
Jesse Freidirt draws the following conclusions con- 
cerning the effeets of the Taft-Hartley Act on industry- 
wide bargaining. ^k
1. If the new définition of "employer” forces the 
abandonment of the Rayonier Doctrine, the 
Board can no longer use history to designate 
the industry-wide unit.
2. The Board’s first duty now is to provide
units which will guarantee individual rights.
3. The right of self-détermination of craft and 
professional -units insured by the Act tends 
to cause the Board to bypass the history of 
the bargaining unit in establishing separate units.
i|.» The union shop section has little effect on 
industry-wide bargaining.
f>. The emergency section is a barometer of Con- 
gress' intent to increase the décision making 
power of local unions at the expense of the 
national group.
The préoccupation of Congress with the protection 
and advaneement of the rights of small groups and indi- 
viduals seemed to indicate a général feeling that the 
centralized union had advanced its position at the ex­
pense of those relatively weak relations. The question 
then arose, had not these advances been made to further 
the rights- of the small group and the individual? For
3k Jesse Freidin, The Taft-Hartley Act and Multi- 
Employer Bargaining. Philadelphia, üniversity of Pennsyl­
vanie Press, 19i+ü» pp. l|0-ij.l.
ko
in dealings with concentrated business establishments the 
national union or similar organization, became the only 
truly effective labor spokesman. Again, it was asked 
whether some subordination of individual rights was not 
a small cost when compared to the benefits derived from 
collective action. Millis and Brown advance two factors 
deserving considération when defining the area, whether 
local or national, of collective b a r g a i n i n g .35
1. A responsible union which must have sufficient 
power in leadership and membership to maintain 
and strengthen its organization in such a de- 
gree as to render it efficient in securing 
employées needs and appropriate aspirations.
2. Management must have sufficient leeway to main­
tain shop discipline and to secure efficiency 
and quality while maintaining tolerable costs of production.
The Taft-Hartley Act has had no revolutionary ef- 
fect on industry-wide bargaining to date. After the law 
was first enacted in 19k7, the usual trial and error and 
général hysteria period followed. When the preliminary 
dust had settled some outlawed practices, such as the 
closed shop, continued, surreptitiously it is granted; 
while other procédures were found to be useless and Inef­
fective. The union shop élection clause was an example 
of the latter. The law has what might be termed a 
"nagging" effect on collective bargaining negotiations.
The union as well as management must always be aware of 
the government in carrying out their negotiations. The
3^ Millis and Brown. o d. cit.. n. 67'*.
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government is definitely a partner, albeit a silent one 
at times, in labor-raanagement negotiations.
Actual praetice has shown that the effectiveness 
of Taft-Hartley dépends upon the political party in power 
and on prevailing public opinion. But the most important 
effect of Taft-Hartley on industry-wide bargaining can 
corne through the N.L.R.B., for it is the duty of this 
Board to de si gnate the appropriate bargaining unit. 
N.L.R.B. décisions under the Taft-Hartley Act
While the Wagner Act did not specifically endorse 
industry-wide bargaining, the décisions of the N.L.R.B. 
clearly indicated that it gave approval to such units. 
Section 9(a) of the N.L.R.A. gave the Board the power to 
détermine the appropriate bargaining unit.
Before setting up any multi-employer unit, the 
Board required that
1. a history of group bargaining must be présent, and
2. the employées1 must want such a unit.
The Shipowners’ Association of the Pacific Coast case3 6
is the précédant case in the multi-employer unit policy.
Heavy weight was placed on the past history of 
group bargaining by the Board in determining the multi- 
employer unit. In the Mobile Steamship Association case3?
36 7 NLRB 1002 (1933)
37 8 NLRB 1297 (1939)
it declared that the industry-wide
• . . unit will insure to employées the full 
benefit of their rights to self-organization 
and to collective bargaining and will other- 
wise effectuate the policies of this Act.
While in the Âdmar Rubber Co. case3S the Board refused 
to destroy an industry-wide unit because of its effective- 
ness in stabilizing conditions of work and other indus­
trial relations standards.
The N.L.R.B., under the Wagner Act, insisted that 
the employer association be représentative of the members, 
but it also preserved the individual member's right of 
self-détermination. Any member rejecting a contract 
agreed upon by the association sacrificed his membership 
in the group and the privilèges this membership entailed.
In 19k7> following two years of post-war labor 
strife, the "evils" of industry-wide bargaining were 
paraded before the public» Alarmed by the Board1s pro­
motion of industry-wide bargaining, Congress immediately 
gave more serious attention to the nuraerous bills intro- 
duced in both houses to amend the Wagner Act. The Taft- 
Hartley Act, passed in 19i+7, brought little actual change 
to the Board1s policies.
The Board has not greatly altered its concept of 
an "employer" under the Taft-Hartley Act. But it is 
careful not to include employées in an industry-wide unit
k2
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over their protests. 3 9 employer inclusion in an
industry-wide unit is still based upon intent; intent
evidenced through participation in negotiations rather
than by simple acceptance of the contract.^
The Board présents the following criteria as signi-
ficant in the détermination of the bargaining unit.^ 1
In resolving unit issues, the Board’s primary 
concern is to group together employées who have 
substantial mutual interests in wages, hours, 
and other conditions of employment. In deter- 
mining whether such conditions exist in groups 
the Board looks . . • to 1) extent and type of 
union organization and of employées involved;
2) pertinent bargaining history; 3) similarity 
of duties, skills, interests, and working con­
ditions of employées; and 4) desires of em­ployées.
The Board continues with regard to multi-employer 
unitsî —
Multi-employer units will be set up under the 
following conditions:
!• if a formai or informai employer associa­
tion with the authority to bargain exista
2. if the employer is a member of the associa­tion
3. if ail members of the association include 
ail their employées under the agreement
4. while taking history into account, the 
Board is primarily concerned with and
39 International Paper Co., 88 NLRB 71 (1950)
liO Associated Shoe Industry, 8l NLRB 22i|. (lpij.9)
^  Fifteenth Annual Report of the N.L.R.B.. Wash.. 
D.C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 19f>l, p. 39.
guided by the décision of the parties in 
determining the unit.
Prora the above statement it seems that the Taft- 
Hartley Act has not had too drastic an interférence with 
industry-wide bargaining through régulation of the N.L.R.B. 
But industry-wide bargaining is actually in jeopardy from 
the Taft-Hartley Act. Por the Act présents potential 
power to greatly interfère with industry-wide bargaining. 
While to date the provisions hâve been loosely interpre— 
ted, Taft-Hartley remains as law. To forestall the possible 
unsettling effects of this flexible law several new labor 
codes have been proposed, such as the following one sug- 
gested by D. L. Jones.1*2
1. A révision of the criteria for inclusion 
and withdrawal from a unit both for employ­
er s and employées.
2. The industry-wide unit should be on a 
voluntary basis. The intent of the parties 
should be measured by déclaration and action 
plus historical background plus représenta­
tive élections for employons as well as em­
ployées. This would give the employer as­
sociation more strength and increase the 
Board’s power. Contract acceptance should 
be the criterion for employer consent and 
withdrawal from the employer association. 
Withdrawal should be followed by a définite 
course of individual action.
3« Some limits to freedom, both of management
and labor, are necessary. The employer should 
be allowed to withdraw from the association 
only at specified times. The negotiated 
agreement should be ratified by a consent 
élection of both employers and employées,
D. L. Jones, "The NLRB and the Multi-Employer 
Unit," Labor Law Journal, vol. 5>, January 19 51*»PP» 45”1*6.
with a refusai to accept the majority vote 
designated an unfair labor practlce.
I*. If a break-down in bargaining negotiations 
leads to coercive action, employers as well 
as employées should be allowed to use col­
lective économie coercive measures.
5* Any attempt at Coopérative1* monopoly by 
management and the union as a resuit of 
industry-wide bargaining should be curbed 
through législative safeguards rather than 
by légal bans on that type of bargaining.
Other légal restraints on industry-wide bargaining
Since the Taft-Hartley Act has proved ineffective 
in stringently curbing unions, pressure has been and is 
being applied in Congress for additional législation.
The Lucas Bill is a typical example. The Lucas Bill 
(H.R. 2£ij.5), containing much the same provisions as the 
Hartley Bill, is designed to eliminate industry-wide bar­
gaining* This is to be accomplished by restricting the 
bargaining agent to one employer. The local union would 
be allowed to affiliate with a national organization, but 
the national could exercise no control over the local.
In addition, the Bill makes any attempt to engage in in­
dustry-wide bargaining illégal, This ban is to be made 
effective by placing unions under the jurisdiction of the 
anti-trust laws and implicitly defining a labor union as 
a monopoly.
The objectives voiced by Gongressman Lucas and 
others are objections to industry-wide uniformity in wages 
and other labor standards.
Suppose the Lucas Bill or a sirailar measure becomes
k$
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the law of industrial relations. What would be the resuit
of a prohibition of industry-wide bargaining in an industry
such as railroads?
. . .  each railroad company would have to con- 
duct separate collective bargaining negotiations 
on scales of pay, hours of work, and other con­
ditions of employment. It would require in 
matters of collective bargaining that the locals 
of a national railroad union be eut off complete- 
ly from the national organization— the trainmen 
of the Pennsylvania, for example, would have to 
match their company-wide union against the re- 
sources of the Pennsylvania Railroad . . . .  
Différent standards for wage payments could exist
for the same occupation on the scores of carriers
throughout the country.H-3
Strikes would be common and the Lucas Bill or any other 
bill would have a difficult time preventing the locals 
from adopting the same agreement. Industry-wide bargain­
ing would be forced ”underground.M
40 John Shott, Issues in Lab or-Management Relations, 
Wash., D. C., The Public Affairs Institute7 195>3> P» 65.
CHAPTER III
AN EVALUATION OP INDUSTRY-WIDE BARGAININQl 
The Extent of Industry-Wide Bargaining
Industry-wide bargaining is not a new phenomenon.
It has existed in the Pressed and Blown Glassware Industry 
since 1893 where it exercises a stabilizing influence on 
the industry which is 70 to 80 percent organized.2 Bar­
gaining between the United States Potters* Association and 
the National Brotherhood of Operative Potters has been on 
an industry-wide basis since 1900.3 Industry-wide bargain­
ing was the method of negotiation in the steel industry 
from the Civil War through the early part of the twentieth 
century.U
But it is only in recent years that industry-wide 
bargaining has become a matter of importance on the indus­
trial relations scene. Por only in eomparatively recent 
years have unions gained enough économie strength to fight
1 Griffln, A. J., Economie Analysis of Indu3try-Wide 
Collective Bargaining, Saint Louis, Saint Louis University,
T9W-
2 Richard A. Lester and Edward Robie, Wages ünder 
National and Régional Collective Bargaining, Princeton,
N. J., Princeton University Press, 19^ +6, p. 10.
3 Ibid., p. 21.
h Robert Tilove, Collective Bargaining in the Steel 
Industry, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1943, p. 28-29.
for bargaining on an industry-wide basis. Of course, the 
goal of most unions has always been industrial standardisa­
tion of wages and other conditions of work for their mem- 
bers. And such an aim implies, under modem structures of 
industry, industry-wide bargaining or some other form of 
negotiation which yields similar results.
As trade unionism has become an established American 
institution and spread throughout the industrial world, so 
also has the use of industry-wide bargaining been extended.
Although the Bureau of Labor Statistics lists only 
seven industries which regularly engage in industry-wide 
bargaining, there are other industries, such as the rail- 
roads, which practice industry-wide bargaining occasional- 
ly, but not consistently. In other industries negotia- 
tions are not conducted on an industry-wide basis, but the 
effects are similar to those achieved through industry- 
wide bargaining. Agreements between the United Packing- 
house Workers of America (CIO) and the Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters and Butcher Workers of North America (AFL) and the 
four largest firms in the meat packing industry expire on 
the same day.5
The following tables show the extent of industry- 
wide bargaining as compared to local or régional bargain­
ing carried on with employer associations.
 ^Bargaining with Associations and Groups of Em­
ployer s , op. cit., p” £7
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AREAS OF INDUSTRY-WIDE BARGAINING6
Industry % of workers under % of column (2)




-  (D______________________ (2J_____________QJ_______
TABLE I
Bituminous coal mining 80-100 80-100
Anthracite coal mining 80-100 80-100
Elevator installation 
and repair 80-100 80-100
Glass and glassware 80-100 60-79
Installation of auto­





Sources: (1) "Collective Bargaining with Associations and 
Groups of Employers,'1 Monthly Labor Review, 
61+, March, 191+7, p. 3997
(2) "Extent of Collective Bargaining and Union 
Récognition,” Monthly Labor Review, 6à. Mav.
191+7, p. 766.
(3) Monthly Labor Revlew, 6I4., March, 191+7, op.
P. 399.
Pierson, Frank C., "Prospects for Industry- 
Wide Bargaining,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
vol. 3, April, 1950, pp. 350-3^2.
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NÏÏMBER 0P EMPLOYEES COVERED BY MULTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING'
TABLE II
Type of Agreement Number of workers Number of column (2)
under union agree- covered by multi- 
ments, 19l|6, employer agreements,
(range) 1947» (range)
 (lj_______________(2J________________(I)_________
Industry-wide 1»593»900 to l,2lj.0,500
bargaining 2,011,100 1,956,800
Régional bargaining 2,256,000 to l,081j.,000 to
2,937,500 1,955,300
Local area or city 5,359,200 to 2,375,500 to
bargaining 7,8lo,800 [j.,677,800
Sourcesî (1) Monthly Labor Review, 6i|, March, 19^1-7» p. 399, 
op. cit.
(2) Ibid., p. 399.
(3) Ibid., p. 399.
Pierson, Frank, 0£. cit., pp. 350-352.7
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Why Industry-Wide Bargaining?
The government and industry-wide bargaining
The government policy of fostering industry-wide 
bargaining began with the N.R.Â. codes in 1933» The 
N.I.R.A. established industry-wide codes governing labor- 
management relations. It is a short step from industry- 
wide labor relations to industry-wide collective bargain­
ing. The N.L.R.B., created originally to administer the 
Wagner Act, continued the policy through its practice of 
establlshing industry-wide or multi-employer bargaining 
units wherever possible. The N.W.L.B., a war time emer- 
gency board, though formally adhering to a 11 local labor 
market" theory, nevertheless in effect favored industry- 
wide wage stabilization and uniformity.
The Board was established to settle disputes not 
agreed upon in collective bargaining negotiations. Be- 
cause of the war time emphasis on continuous production, 
fairly rigid standards were established to govern labor- 
management relations.
Labor economists and industry-wide bargaining
Industry-wide bargaining is advocated by a number 
of prominent labor economists. Pisher reaches the follow' 
ing conclusions specifically in regard to the bituminous 
coal industry, but generally to be applied to ail indus­
tries having similar characteristics.
The history of labor relations in bituminous 
coal shows the utter helplessness of the in­
dividual employée and employer in the face of
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économie forces and conditions that prevail 
in an overdeveloped industry. In any highly 
compétitive industry in which the establish­
ments are many and widely decentralized, and 
supply common markets, collective bargaining 
under capable leadership is necessary not only 
to protect workers and maintain decent stand­
ards of living, but also to safeguard employ­
ers1 investments.
Expérience with labor relations in this in­
dustry also vérifiés the contention of econo- 
mists that succèssful collective bargaining 
must embrace substantially ail producing fields 
serving common markets. The failure of the Cen­
tral Compétitive Field Compact must be laid 
largely to union inability to organize th©
Southern fields. No System of collective bar­
gaining can long work if ©ne group of employers 
must pay rigid wage scales and meet other union 
standards of employment, while another group 
conducts its business under flexible wage scales 
and working conditions arrived at through in­
dividual bargaining.”
McCabe advocates industry-wide bargaining
. . . where compétition is brisk and labor costs 
a comparatively large part of the cost of the 
product. . . the idéal is bilatéral industry- 
wide bargaining not unilatéral national collec­
tive action on the union side opposed to local 
collective action, if not individual employer 
action, on the other.9
The advantages of collective bargaining as listed by Pro-
fessor McCabe are; 1) simultaneous tiraing of wage increases
and decreases; 2) less flexibility of wage changes during
ups and downs of the business cycle; 3) géographie uniform-
ity of wage rates and labor costs; and 1+) élimination of
8 Waldo E. Pisher, Collective Bargaining in the Bi- 
tuminous Coal Industry; An Appraisal, Philadelphia, Univer- 
sity of Pennsylvanie Press, 19l+&> P« 1+2.
9 David A. McCabe, nProblems of Industry-Wide and 
Régional Trade Agreements,*’ American Economie Review, 
XXXIII, March, 19^3, p. 169.
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differentials based on costa of living.^
Richard Lester clairas favorable results from in­
dustry-wide bargaining on the grounds that:
By making wage scales more uniform géographieally, 
it helps to reduce employée dissatisfaction and 
labor turn-over within the industry. Labor un- 
rest is . « • reduced under industry-wide bar­
gaining • . • industry-wide bargaining, by pro- 
viding union security and encouraglng factual, 
reasoned negotiations, was more likely to resuit 
in wage décisions that take into considération 
the économie needs and interests of the whole in­
dustry ,11
The Labor Committee of the Twentieth Century Fund 
recommends
• • • that managements and unions together explore 
the advantages arising from a wider application of 
market-wide collective bargaining. To be sure 
this technique is not without injurious potentia- 
lities.
Yet already this régional and industry-wide 
approach, whether in peace or war, has accomplish- 
ed a great deal to bring stability to coal mining, 
the needle trades, to shipbuilding and other in­
dustries. It provides management with predie- 
tables in labor costs. It protects the worker 
against the caprieious wage slash and enterprise 
in général against the unsettling effect of bid- 
ding up wages that accompanies a period of labor 
shortage with its scamping and pirating. It has 
often promoted the introduction of labor saving 
devices in a sane, ''staggered" manner to cushion, 
or entirely offset, injurious social conséquences 
of mass layoffs, and discharges:. Furthermore, 
since the art of business is being daily trans- 
muted into the science of management, the compon- 
ents of an industry should be enabled to proceed
10 Ibld»» P. 173.
11 Richard A. Lester, ”Wage Levels and Price 
Levels,1* Proceedings of the Conférence on Industry-Wide 
Collective Bargaining, May il;, 19UÜ, Philadelphia, ïïni- 
versity of Pennsylvanie Press, 1949» p. I4.8•
on a more orderly basis.^
Employers and industry-wide bargaining
When employers have accepted industry-wide bargain­
ing, they have done so mainly because of the stabilizing 
effect it has on labor costs for the entire industry.
Each firm knows where it stands in relation to its fellows 
on labor costs. Industry-wide bargaining through employ­
er associations enables the firms to bargain on more equal 
terms with the national unionj; it prevents the use of 
whipsawing tac tics by the union, and equalizes., in many 
instances, the bargaining positions of the ,,bign and 
"little" employers. Industry-wide bargaining, though, 
is not favored by tne majority of employers» They prefer 
single firm bargaining because this form of negotiation 
gives greater freedom of action and allows management more 
flexibility under the agreement. A large number of em­
ployers consider the latter factor essential for the ef­
ficient opération of their firms.
Unions and industry-wide bargaining
The greatest impetus to industry-wide bargaining 
has corne from the unions. They contend that industry-wide 
bargaining reduces compétitive pressures on wages and 
strengthens their own bargaining position. For the
5k
12 Williams on and Herbert Harris, Trends in 
Collective Bargaining: A Summary of Recent Expérience.“New 
York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 19l|5, pp. 23I4.-235.
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unions, industry-wide bargaining has the advantage of 
simplicity, and also présents a method of forcing un- 
friendly firms into line without having to penalize 
friendly employers* 3^
The union trend has been, first, to organize an 
employer on a local level. If the firm is a member of a 
national industry the union pushes for régional and 
finally industry-wide organization and collective bargain­
ing. Such a policy is inévitable in view of the général 
union desire to stabilize wages and working conditions.
The following statement by Philip Murray may be considered 
as representing the CIO's attitude toward industry-wide 
bargaining.
Modem labor relations are an intégral part 
of industrial planning. Such relations encom- 
passed in collective bargaining are Inevitably 
directed toward industry-wide agreements.Ï4
Advantages of industry-wide bargaining
Prom the view of labor, industry-wide bargaining 
is advantageous because it 1 ) stabilizes the industry,
2) promotes industrial peace, and 3) has a bénéficiai ef- 
fect on the economy.
Industry-wide bargaining stabilizes an industry by 
achieving standard labor conditions and by enabling both
3 W. S. Woytinsky and Associates, Employaient and 
Wages in the United States, New York, The Twentieth Cen- 
tury Fund, 1953» P» 250.
Philip Murray, Steel Labor. April 18, 19i|l, p. 11.
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management and labor to have a wlder view of industrial 
problems. An industry-wide view is one which will give 
greater meaning and aim to industrial planning. The re- 
lationship has been aptly expressed as: follows:
To put a stojD to the compétition among workers 
for jobs • • • /the union7 is forced to strive 
for a kind of '•monopoly'1 since only by controlling 
ail the jobs in an industry and imposing uniform 
wage rates and hours and working conditions can 
it remove labor from compétition.15
Industrial peace i£ promoted by industry-wide 
bargaining through an increase in union security and the 
formulation of policies of interest to the workers. Once 
a union has achieved a measure of security within an in­
dus try ; once it is protected against such practices as 
non-union compétition and compétitive wage cutting among 
employers, it (the union) modifies its militant attitude 
to become an organisation which, in coopération with 
management, may achieve greater industrial efficiency 
and so reap greater benefits for its membership. The 
workers, too, once their major demands are met, develop 
a spirit of coopération and help increase production ef­
ficiency. The prévention of work stoppages is an addi- 
tional reason advanced in favor of industry-wide promo­
tion of industrial peace.
This statement must be qualified in some respects. 
For example, it is true that the strength of centralized
15 Benjamin L. Masse, S.J., ”Industry-Wide Collec­
tive Bargaining I,” America, LXXVII, April 5, 19Û7, p. 11.
Si
unions can more effectively, in some instances, prevent
wildcat strikes and the strength of employer associations
may be used to keep récalcitrant firms in line. But
statistics to some extent belle the former contention.
In many instances when the local organization feels that
the national is becoming too far removed from the trade
union scene or that the national union is overlooking
some particular local grievance or problem, the local
union will engage in strike action in self-defense. The
local union is the more important group of the two* The
national has no existence without the local; the local
union is the primary soeio-democratic institution»
Then again, the greater equalization of économie
strength, some students of the labor movement hold, makes
strikes too costly as far as both sides are concerned,
Yet, others point out that while the strikes are fewer
in number they are of greater intensity. On the basis
of this increased intensity of industry-wide strikes,
Professor Slichter has withheld full approval of market-
wide bargaining in the recommendations made by the Labor
Committee of the Twentieth Century Fund. He has taken
the position:
« » • that the problems of industry-wide bargains 
need much further analysis before industry-wide 
bargaining is recommended for large industrie® 
such as automobile, coal, or railroads. • * On a 
number of occasions in recent years the nation 
has been confronted with either the possibility 
or the reality of a complété shutdown of the coal 
industry or railroad transportation, The consé­
quences of such a tie-up to the économie life of
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the country are obviously far reaching and might 
be disasterous. I am not convinced that the eom- 
munity has learned enough about preventing strikes 
or that it is safe to give several hundreds of 
thousands of men power to interrupt production in 
ail branches of industry by shutting down ail 
plants in a key industry such as coal, railroada, 
or automobiles
By contrast, it can be argued that industry-wide 
bargaining promûtes industrial peace through réduction 
of the number of work stoppages only in so far as it 
produces far-sighted labor leaders and responsible unions 
and in so far as it places a premium on statesmanlike 
rather than militant labor organization.
«
One argument to that effect is that industry-wide
bargaining sets-up an environment for the development of
a bénéficiai wage-cost-price basis throughout an industry*
It has been noted that
. . .  its /Tndustry-wide bargaining* chief con­
tribution is that it does not leave the wage- 
price-profit ratio, which is so important in the 
control of cycles, to impersonal forces of the 
market place, but subordinates it to the common good*17
Industry-wide bargaining influences commodity 
prices through the medium of the wages set in bargaining 
negotiations. The area over which wages and prices are 
set is extended by this type of bargain. And while the 
power of the organized employers to resist wage demands
^  Williamson and Harris, op. cit.. pp. 232-233.
^  Benjamin L* Masse, S.J., HIndustry-Wide Collec­
tive Bargaining II, America. LXXVII, April 12, 191+7, p. 38*
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increases, their potential résistance is lessened because 
ail employers in the industry will be affected in the 
same way by the wage changes. In the silk and rayon dye- 
ing and finishing industry, which is covered by an indus­
try-wide agreement, the employers feel that "it makes 
little différence how high the level of wage ratio is so 
long as they are uniform for ail producers.
It should be noted, in discussing the impact of 
collective bargaining on the economy, that too much trust 
is placed in collective bargaining as a policy setting 
institution, a work for which it is not suited. The 
bargainers cannot assume responsibility for the effects, 
especially the employment effect, of their décisions be­
cause the wage bargain covers only a small part of the
whole economy. Further, unions are not in a position to
\calculate the effects because other and more powerful 
conditions operate which are unstable and beyond their 
control; ". . . production coefficients, substitution 
functions, and aggregate demand do not remain constant.
The only way in which the union or management or 
any other participant in the wage bargain-can be expected 
to carry responsibility for the effects of its décisions 
occurs when it takes part in the formulation of a national
1 Lester and Robie, o£. cit.. p. 67.
Arthur M. Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, lÇÎjBTp. 79*
wage policy. Slichter writea:
If the trade union movement were to be success- 
ful in developing an organisation for represent- 
ing the interesta of labor as a whole, the problem 
of national wage policy would be largely solved, 
because organized employées will soon be such a 
large part of the commun!ty that their interests 
as a group will coincide fairly closely with the 
interests of the entire c o m m u n i t y . 2 0
Only through a tripartite group to set up criteria
by which wage rates may be determined by the bargaining ne-
gotiation can the effects of industry-wide bargaining on
employaient be calculated. In the meanwhile, some yardstick
may be developed along the lines suggested by Masse.
Characteristics of Industry-Wide Bargaining
Characteristics of the industry-wide agreement
As the contract covers more and more firms in an 
industry and as the bargaining relationship tends to be- 
come industry-wide, the agreement takes on légal, formai, 
and impersonal characteristics. For the agreement must 
cover firms having différent degrees of efficiency, out- 
put, production techniques, labor relations policies, and 
so on, as well as firms differing in size and financial 
position. The various firms in an industry must be fit 
into a common and uniform pattern. As a resuit the final 
industry-wide agreement frequently fails to measure up 
to the expectations of both the local union and local
60
20 Sumner H. Slichter, The Challenge of Industrial 
Relations « Trade Unions, Management and the Public In- 
terest, Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell Univers!.ty Press, 195T»
PP. 97-98.
6 1
management groupe. An industry-wide agreement negotiated 
in the hosiery industry is evaluated as follows:
The executive board of the Hosiery Workers 
(CIO) was subjected to considérable internai 
criticism during the 19^5 negotdations. Of the 
thirty-one demands which différent groups within 
the union had caused the board to make on manage­
ment in the industry, only nine were incorporated 
in the final agreement. 21
It is necessary in industry-wide bargaining to 
"achieve a substantial unanimity behind the final agree­
ment. A bare majority is not sufficient.”22 This is a 
difficult achievement even on the local level. The re- 
moteness of the negotiating group from the local level 
is a real hazard in industry-wide bargaining. For the 
group tends to lose sight of true union aims. In sorne 
cases the local becomes disgusted with the national bar­
gaining poliey or with the national’s disregard of its 
legitimate grievances and engages in wildcat strikes. 
Because of the légal and formai procédures of industry- 
wide bargaining and the rigid nature of this type of 
bargain, as well as the undue emphasis it places on uni- 
form patterns in dealing with diverse employér-employee 
conditions, it dirainishes, to a certain degree, the possi­
bilités of dealing with significant problems on their
21 Jack Barbash, Labor Unions in Action: A Study 
of the Mainsprings of Unionism, New York, Harper & Bros..
194B7~p . dd.
22 Sylvester Garrett and L. Reed Tripp, Management 
Problems Impiicit in Multi-Employer Bargaining, Philadel- 
phia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 19)4.9, p. i|6>.
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own merits.
The flexibility and discriminations that 
promote adaptation to spécifie situations and 
concrets problems ^tend to be replaced bj7 a 
hard and fast formula applicable to ail bargain­ing situations. 23
And despite the prevalence of industry-wide bargain­
ing in an industry, the various employers still tend to 
think in terms of the plant while the national union 
thinks in terms of the industry. Por the problems still 
exist on the local level even though the organization 
may be effected on an industry basis. Day to day dealings 
are not with "the rank and file,” the "union,” or other 
abstractsj rather they are with the particular worker or 
with local #3; they are with concrets figures— with indi­
vidual s and groups. If "collective bargaining is one method 
of management"^ then it must be flexible enough to deal 
with particular problems; with local problems. Neither 
industry-wide bargaining nor nationally formulated poli- 
cies by themselves are effective in such particular situ­
ations. Local level bargaining, which agréés with the 
overall économie objectives of the union, must supplément 
industry-wide bargaining if the common good is to be at- 
tained.
Benjamin M. Selekman, "Varieties of Labor Re­
lations," Harvard Business Revlew. XXVII, March, 19lj.9, p. 176.
2ii Neil Chamberlain, "What is Management1s Right 
to Manage?" Fortune. XL, July 19^ 9, p. 70.
63
The restriction of the Individual f irm* s Independence
In situations characterized by industry-wide bar­
gaining it is common for the various firms to act to- 
gether only when negotiating the agreement, whereaa the 
unions always act in a group. Industry-wide bargaining 
centralizes management décisions. The power t© negotiate 
and implement th® agreement rests with the employer assoc­
iation or other central authority. In the Pressed and 
Blown Glassware Industry
. . .  the joint conférence décisions are binding 
on ail members and no agreement contrary to the 
national rules may be made locally . . .  Final 
appeal of ail disputes and grievances is made  ^
to the annual or spécial national conférence.*5
In the Pottery Industry "the union conférence committee
and the Employers' Association are considered to have
binding p o w e r " ^ 6  over the industry's firms. A great deal
of power must be vested in the negotiating group to make
it in any way effective. In referring t© wagea, Lester
and Robie discoveredî
A précisé schedule of rates in the agreement, 
enforced by central Controls, is essential to the 
maintenance of substantial wage uniformity under national bargaining. 27
Lester and Robie, ©£. oit., p. lij..
26 Ibid* » P* 25.
27 Ibid.. p. 92.
Uniforraity and the indu3try-wide agreement
Unlforraity 1s stressed ln any industry-wide agree- 
ment, particularly in regard to wage rates. The latter 
are the key to standardized conditions in an industry. 
Uniform wage rates are the goal of both union and manage­
ment. From the union1s point of view the question of 
equity is important as it applies to the principle of 
equal pay for equal work. The unions also want to prevent 
undercutting of wage rates by removing wages from compéti­
tion. Management benefits through the élimination of 
wage differentials among various firms, the stabilisa­
tion of labor costs, as well as the élimination of 
"whipsawing" tactics by the union.
Interfirra comparisons possible under industry-wide 
bargaining increase the drive for industry-wide wage 
rates. Under "national and régional collective bargain­
ing wages are the central element,"2® Great political 
pressures are brought to bear on national unions to es- 
tablish uniform wage rates in an industry. For as a 
political entity, a union must be always cognizant of the 
effect its policies have on the local temper and it must 
also be alert to demands made by the locals.
The tendency toward wage rate uniformity under 
industry-wide bargaining is made clear by a "before and 
after" comparison of the bituminous coal and the pressed




and blown glassware industries. Prior to April 1937, 
th® Southern wage rate for day workers in bituminous 
coal was 72.9 cents an hour or 92.7 percent of the 
northern rate @f 76»6i|. cents per hour* The agreement 
in April 1937» reduced the differential by raising the 
Southern wage to 80.0 cents per hour or 93«3 percent of 
the northern wage of 85.7 cents. The differential was 
completely éliminâted in I9I4.1.
In the pressed and blown glassware industry uniform 
piece rates are set by annual wage conférences.3°
Despite the insistence on wage rate uniformity, no 
one method of wage payraent exista under industry-wide 
bargaining. Both time and piece rates, as well as spécial 
allowances for singular opérations, prevail under industry- 
wide bargaining. And while uniformity in wage rates sta- 
bilizes labor costs and takes labor out of compétition, 
différences in rates exist between firms in an industry 
because of différences in equipment, différences in ap­
plication and degrees of the workers' skills, and différ­
ences in the working conditions.
The full fashioned hosiery industry présents a good 
example of rate allowances. According to the industry- 
wide agreement
29 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, The
Changing Status of Bituminous-Coal Miners, 1937-U6. --
Wash., D. C., United States Government Printing Office, 
pp. 2-3. '
3° Lester and Robie, 0£. cit.. p. l£.
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• . • uniform piece rates apply within a ”reason- 
able range” of conditions, but beyond that range 
the standard rates are adjusted in order to keep 
in line the earnings between workers expending the same skill or effort. 31
The extent to which industry wage stabilization 
is achieved dépends, to a large extent, on what part 
labor costs are of total costs. The percentage is usual- 
ly high in the majority of industries engaged in industry- 
wide bargaining. In pressed and blown glassware labor 
costs equal from 60 to 70 percent of total costs in hand 
working shops and from 35 to J4O percent in machine 
shops;32 labor costs: in pottery equal 60 percent of total 
costsj33 and fashioned hosiery between I4.0 and 50
percent of total costs. 3^+
The basis for wage rate uniformity is not identi- 
cal in industries practicing industry-wide bargaining. 
Thomas Kennedy lists seven types of uniformity which may 
prevail.35
1. uniformity of rate per output
2. uniformity of rate per unit of skill and effort required
31 Thomas Kennedy, The Significance of Wage Uni­
formité, Philadelphie, University of Pennsylvania Press. 
1 9 4 9 7 p .  17.
Lester and Robie, o£. cit., p. 10.
^  Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid., P. UU-
Kennedy, o£. cit.. p. 1.35
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3. uniformity of rate per hours of labor of a
particular type
uniformity of rate range®
5. uniformity of minimum rates
6. uniformity of rate change®
7* uniformity of total costs
These various rates are not complimentary and should be 
chosen with care. The différences are évident in the 
économie effect® of the rates. One type results in an 
équitable relationship between eamings for the same work 
xn différent firms, another does not; one encourages? 
technological advance, another discourages it; one pro- 
tects marginal firms, while another efficiently éliminâtes 
them» The objectives of the parties to the industry-wide 
agreement are the primary déterminants of the method of 
wage payment to be employed in an industry. These objec­
tives, in turn, must be formulated with an eye to their 
over-all économie results and the common good of the 
workers in the individual firm in the industry.
The type of wage rate or wage adjustment uniformi­
ty under industry-wide bargaining will ultimately dépend 
on the policies or objectives of labor, management, and 
the government.
Industry-Wide Bargaining versus Local Bargaining
The firm and the industry
The nature of the firmï The firm is an instrument 
for organizing various factors of production for a
6 8
particular purpose. If the firm is to survive and pros- 
per, both the aims or goals of the institution as well as 
the diverse motives of the individual must be recognized 
and satisfied.
The nature of the industry: The industry is com-
prised of a group of firms producing a homogeneous product 
but possessing différent characteristics of such factors 
as the human element, the location of the various firms 
with respect to raw materials and markets, and différent 
methods of organisation.
Uniform wage rates and local bargaining
One of the best methods to détermine whether or not 
industry-wide bargaining is an effective and équitable 
method of industrial relations is to see how it affects 
an individual firm. Since ail, or almost ail, industry- 
wide agreements tend to establish standard wage rates, 
this criterion may be applied to an individual firm.
At présent no unanimity exists among workers or 
employers regarding methods of wage payment. But time 
rates and incentive rates find favor among industries en­
gage d in industry-wide bargaining. An historical obser­
vation may be made here regarding industries which have 
used industry-wide negotiations over long periods to the 
effect that piece rate payments or variations thereof ap- 
pear in most instances. In the pressed and blown glass- 
ware industry, the pottery industry, and the full fashion- 
ed hosiery industry, ail firms with long historiés of
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industry-wide bargaining, wage rates are standardized on 
a piece rate b a s i s . 3 6
Unions are generally found to prefer time rates 
since their objective is a standard wage rate for the same 
work; while management usually favors piece rates because 
they may then more accurately détermine unit labor costs. 
But whatever the method of determining wage rates, it is 
essentiel that the one decided upon be common to ail firms 
in the indus try.
Whenever a system of wage uniformity is in opéra­
tion, regardless of the system of measurement used, it 
must be supplemented by a program of job évaluation and 
classification to insure proper opération of the standard- 
ization program. Non-uniformity results from the lack of 
a system of classification administered and enforced on 
the industry level. Yet some jobs are peculiar to a par­
ticular firm and in such a case wage rates are determined 
locally. These unique jobs are usually excluded from an 
industry-wide wage rate scale. Lester and Robie point out 
in discussing the fiat glass industry
. . . in many of the skilled maintenance occupa­
tions and in some other jobs, rates of pay are 
slightly higher at Libbey-Owens-Pord. Lack of 
complété wage uniformity is, however, primarily 
due to différences between the two companies in 
production methods, job content, utilization of 
female workers, and application of incentive 
Systems.37
36 Lester and Robie, op. cit., pp. l£, 16, & i|8.
37 Lester and Robie, 0£. cit., p. 73»
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If labor is to have any voice in determining stan­
dard wage rates and other working conditions it cannot ig­
nore the local level. For Mthe application of the common 
rule to uncommon situations is the most disrputive influ­
ence in multi-employer bargaining. "38
Alexander Héron draws the following conclusions as 
to the reasons for successful bargaining.
The American worker accepts, and coopérâtes in, 
the activities of business on the basis of two fun— 
damental conditions. First, he must believe and 
know that the hierarchy by which his work is direc- 
ted has meaning. Second, he must know that his 
work has meaning; must know what that meaning is; 
must know that through that meaning he is actually a part of the hierarchy. 39
Some industries have developed such a feeling among 
their workers, while many others have not. When industry- 
wide bargaining results in an almost exclusive emphasis 
on rigidity, standardisation, législation, and concentra­
tion, it does little to promote individualism or to add 
to the dignity of the individual worker as a human being.
Labor and management recognize non-uniformltv in local 
conditions
That collective bargaining is oriented to the par- 
ticular is évident on examination of the trucking industry.
38 Clark Kerr and Roger Randall, Collective Bargain- 
iü bbe Pacific Coast Pulp and Paper Industry, Philadel-
phia, University of Pennsylvania Press, Î9P, p. 23.
39 Alexander Héron, Why Men Work, Stanford, Stan­
ford University Press, 1948» p. 160.
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From one view, the industry is one of the most homogene- 
ous; it sells a single service. But upon observation of 
working conditions, it is found to be one of the most di­
verse industries. While some récognition of local condi­
tions is given in industry-wide agreements, the tendency 
toward uniformity is évident. This is almost an "uncon- 
scious" tendency. For at the industry level it appears 
much simpler and more efficient to résolve as many of the 
items on the bargaining agenda along uniform lines as pos­
sible. It is very easy for the negotiators to overlook 
the individual worker and the single firm.
Industry-wide uniformity of wages and différences in pro­
ductivité
'’No argument is used with more conviction or soph­
istication than that wages should vary with changes in 
productivity.
During périods of prosperity unions are on the 
alert to secure increased wages, while during periods of 
declining prosperity and production, management is deter- 
mined to reduce the wage rates. Nonetheless, tying wages 
to productivity must resuit in great inequalities in the 
structure of wage rates. Wages can no longer reflect 
skill, experience, and similar considérations. An in- 
crease in productivity in one department, firm or industry
, _ ^ John T. Dunlop, Collective Bargaining: Principles
and Cases, Chicago, John D. Irwin, IncT, 19^9,p.~9l+. --
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does not guarantee similar increases in other work places.
A relationship between wage rates for the entire firm and 
particular job standards should be created for without a 
reasonable wqge structure chaotic conditions may easily 
characterize the firm. This application is made on a firm 
by firm basis, for the application of uniform incentive 
plans to ail the firms in an industry is impossible since 
ail firms in an industry are characterized by différent 
levels of production.
The économie effects of wage uniformity on the var­
ions firms dépends greatly on the level at which the wage 
rates are set and on the three major causes of différence 
in productivity between the firms, namely; the différences 
in managerial ability, worker aptitudes, and resources and 
location. The latter cause has long been recognized as an 
excuse for wage rate differentials in the bituminous coal 
indus try.
The so-called Hprinciple of compétitive 
equality" sanctioned lower tonnage rates for 
less favorably situated mines, with respect 
to transportation costs at least, as well as 
exemption in some degree from higher tonnage 
rates for abnormally difficult conditions 
for the miner s. 1+1
Pour major alternative methods of setting wage rates 
are open to unions and management in their negotiations. 
They will be eonsidered briefly. The first method sets
1+1 David A. McCabe, "Problems of Industry-Wide and 
Régional Trade Agreements,M American Economie Review, 
XXXIII, March, 191+3, P. 167.
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the rates low enough to allow the marginal producers to 
remain in business. While the union usually favors this 
method as a means of assuring their members more jobs, it 
is invariably opposed by the most efficient firms. Politi- 
cally speaking the national union has a difficult time 
agreeing to this scheme, though, because the possibility 
exists for workers in the most efficient firms to receive 
higher wages without the marginal producers. A second al­
ternative fixes wage rates to enable a 11 représentative 
firm" to earn a normal profit. Immediately the question 
arises as to what characteristics the "représentative firm" 
possesses. Under this plan as the profile of the "repré­
sentative firm" becomes more and more efficient the sub­
normal firms are forced from the industry until conditions 
of monopoly or oligopoly prevail.
One of the best known methods is the ability-to-pay 
scheme for establishing wage rates. The political reper­
cussions under centralized industry-wide bargaining make 
this type of wage negotiation impractical. The last method, 
uniform piece rates, is virtually prohibited by the dif­
férences in plant equipment, et cetera. Strict adhérence 
to this method produces an adverse effect on technological 
advances in the industry.
Political considérations important
Political considérations play a definite rôle in 
negotiating the collective bargain. This includes the
7b
politieal necessity of reconciling conflicting pressure 
groups within the two institutions. Then, too, industry- 
wide bargaining makes comparisons between industries and 
firms an easier task, so the union leaders are under con­
stant pressure to meet increases gained by other groups.
The national chargeter of this type of bar­
gaining negotiation . . . tends to impose the 
results upon other industries. As we have ai­
re ady observed, a great deal of publicity at­
tends negotiations with the large steel, auto­
mobile or electrical companies. This, plus 
the fact that other industries are linked with 
them by financial and organizational ties, ail 
but makes it ineumbent upon the leaders of 
other unions and companies to press for settle- 
ments similar to those consummated in the major 
industries. This can have some grim results, 
as the ordinary give and take of collective bar­
gaining is subordinated to aping a pattern ar- 
rived at in some other industry whose cost, 
price and profit picture may be quite différent.4-2
An industry is a group of partially heterogeneous 
firms each having their own problems requiring local solu­
tion. Industry-wide bargaining tends to recognize the in­
dustry as a single institution in applying uniform stand­
ards. Until ail the firms corne under rigid central con- 
trol the industry is of secondary importance. The above 
considération of the major aspect of standardization, 
wage rates, under industry-wide bargaining indicates the 
extent that politieal rather than économie considérations
b% Everett M. Kassalow, ,fNew Patterns of Collective 
Bargaining, * Insights into Labor Issues, Richard A. Lester
& Joseph Shister, eds., New York, the Macmillan Co., 19^8» 
pp. 126-127.
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are employed in industry-wide bargaining and how these 
fail to solve the économie difficulties existing at the 
local level.
Industry-Wide Bargaining, Local Bargaining, 
and Tripartite Planning
The trend toward industry-wide bargaining attempts 
to fill a need for an effective method of control of some 
spécial industry problems. This need for industrial con­
trol is most évident in industries where problems con- 
fronting the employers and workers are beyond local con­
trol. Because of the chaotic conditions in the bituminous 
coal industry, operators were forced to engage in compéti­
tive wage cuttlng to remain in business. Labor costs rep- 
resented 60 to 65 percent of total costs. On the other 
hand, it may be said that industry-wide bargaining is not 
an effective tool for integrating the interests of the two 
distinct employer groups in bituminous coal; the "captive" 
mines owned by the steel companies and the railroads ver­
sus the "commercial” mines. Still the industry produces 
an almost homogeneous product.
Under conditions such as those existing in bitumin­
ous coal industry-wide bargaining appears to be inévitable. 
For either the union and management negotiate on an indus­
try-wide level with the resulting industry stability, 
equalization of labor costs, and union security, or they 
must operate on a purely local level and face industrial 
instability, compétitive wage cutting, and union insecurity.
7 6
Alternatives to industry-wlde bargaining
Are there any alternatives or substituts s for in­
dustry-wide bargaining? Two labor economists hold that 
there are satisfactory substitûtes.
Witte maintains that the alternatives are not be- 
tween local and industry-wide bargaining, but between 
industry-wide bargaining and union-wide bargaining with 
national wage patterns established by the union.43 Witte, 
in effect, argues for industry-wide bargaining because the 
only real alternative to industry-wide bargaining is not 
local bargaining but union-wide bargaining— a practice in 
which bargains are not negotiated between national unions 
and employer associations, but one in which national 
unions will draw up a "form" contract or pattern and force 
this upon the individual employers.
Professor Lester holds that industry-wide bargain­
ing furthers
. . . f a c t u a l ,  re a so n e d  n e g o t ia t io n s  /w h ic h  a r e 7  
more l i k e l y  to  r e s u i t  i n  wage d é c is io n s  th a t  ta k e  
i n t o  c o n s id é r a t io n  th e  needs and i n t e r e s t s  o f  the 
w hole i n d u s t r y . 44
But equalizing the bargaining power of labor and manage­
ment does not secure industrial peace and may lead to ex- 
tended strikes. The negotiators, as représentatives of
43 Edwin E. Witte, "Economie Aspects of Industry- 
Wide Bargaining," Proceedings of the Conférence on Indus- 
try-Wide Collective Bargaining, May lit., 194^» Philadel- 
phia, Üniversity of Pennsylvania Press, 1949» p. 32.
44 Lester, "Wage Levels and Price Levels," op. cit.,
p. 48.
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either labor or management, usually corne to the bargaining 
conférence with a set sériés of semi-inflexible problems 
and solutions. The proposais made at the conférence take 
on the nature of demands rather than suggestions to be con- 
sidered, evaluated, and worked out to the mutual interest 
of both the union and the employer. The représentatives 
corne to the conférence with a definite platform. The col­
lective bargaining relationship under industry-wide bar­
gaining shows danger of returning to the early unilatéral 
type bargain where one side presented its demands which 
were either accepted or rejected by the other party.
The situation is very évident in basic industries 
occupyiag a vital position in the economy. Here it may be 
seen that either or both parties hold out and wait for gov- 
ernment intervention and a better settlement. In the 19^ +6 
steel dispute the industry refused to sign an agreement 
with the union until the government granted an additional 
$1.00 a ton increase in the basic steel price.
Industry-wlde bargaining: disadvantages
While industry-wide bargaining has many previously 
mentioned advantages, particularly in disorganized indus­
tries, it also possesses two major disadvantages.
First, at the local level, single firms are governed 
by a uniformly bargained industry-wide contract which tends 
to ignore the économie situations peculiar to them. The 
locals are subject to rigid national union control.
7 8
Industry-wide bargaining is highly effective in stabiliz- 
ing chaotic industries and overcoming problems which can- 
not be met by the individual or at the local level; but 
concem is expressed over the concentration of power in 
the hands of industry-wide bargaining groups to deal with 
differing and intricate situations in différent firms and 
various géographie locations. Local firms have the right 
and are better able to bargain on their particular affairs 
providing these local bargains are compatible with indus­
try-wide policies and negotiations.
Secondly, the interests of the employer and em­
ployées are organized without provision for the intégra­
tion and compatability of each. The détermination of res- 
ponsibilities by the union and management and the assump- 
tion of same by each party are not assured by industry- 
wide negotiations.
How well it will work dépends upon the 
économie statesmanship of the représentatives 
of the two parties. If both parties will as­
sume their responsibilities to each other and 
to the public, relate their demands to the 
realitles of économie life, and share the gains
of progress not only among themselves but with
the public, industry-wide bargaining can be 
successful .k$
The crux of the matter seems to be the adéquate dé­
termination of the actual responsibilities to be assumed 
by each group. But how can the bargaining parties them­
selves actually détermine their common goals and the path
that leads to these aims? There is need for a commonly
b%  P i s h e r ,  op. c i t . , p. J+3»
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recognized framework of principles on which labor and man­
agement can base their actions. Elevating collective bar­
gaining from the local to the industry-wide level does not 
alter its essentially spécifie nature. The industry-wide 
bargaining negotiations do not provide for a central author- 
ity that is représentative of the diverse interests in the 
industry, and that is, by reason of the fact, able to guide 
the industry along lines of broad, général policy and help 
adapt these policies t© the local level.
Can the "impartial chairman" or "arbitrator," em­
ployé d by the great majority of industries engaged in in­
dustry-wide bargaining, perform this regulatory function?
No. For the task of the "impartial chairman" is to inter- 
pret the existing contract as it is written. He has no 
Creative authority, although he may make suggestions con- 
cerning the fitness of the agreement. It is évident that 
the bargaining procèss has becorne its own controi. The 
only Controls over industry-wide bargaining are those made 
by the parties themselves.
Ludwig Teller has proposed a government administer- 
ed national labor code to be used as a framework within 
which to carry on industry-wide bargaining. The code 
reads as follows:
Industry-wide collective bargaining and bargain­
ing agreements made in furtherance of an effort 
to improve or stabilize conditions in a given 
industry or area should be favored, but the exé­
cution of such agreements should constitute an 
unfair labor practice if
1. price fixing is thereby effected, or
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2. markets are thereby allocated, or
3. limitations upon output are thereby provided, 
or unreasonable methods of production are thereby required, or
l+. the rights of an employer not party to the 
agreement to enter the industry is thereby 
restricted, provided, however, that the con- 
tracting labor union may agree that its mem- 
bers shall work for none but such employers 
as become and remain members of the employ- 
ers* association, if any, or as comply with 
the provisions of the agreement.46
In order to assure enforcement of the code
♦ . . industry-wide collective bargaining agree­
ment s, and the général rules and régulations or 
practices thereunder, should be in writing, and 
copies of such documents should be filed with 
the proposed labor court.4?
This proposed code provides too much government con- 
trol and direction of bargaining. As a resuit, collective 
bargaining would soon become a government function and 
would cease to be either Collective11 or a ,fbargain.,! 
Législation can be used to provide a framework within 
which industry-wide bargaining may take place, but légis­
lation cannot do the bargaining. Responsible industry- 
wide bargaining may be achieved only through éducation and 
experience.
Bargaining at the industry-wide level is concerned 
with making standard solutions rather than providing, as 
it should, a framework within which peculiar or unique
Ludwig Teller, A Labor Policy for America: A 
National Labor Code, New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co., IÇkÇ, 
pp. 17^-173:
k7 Ibid., p. 176.
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situations can be worked out at the local level. Indus­
try-wide bargaining
. . . must be based on a functional intégra­
tion which conceives of the enterprise as com- 
posed of its various interest groups and builds 
its organization around them and encompasses 
them.^o
Until ail firms are mergeâ into one gigantic trust or com­
bine, the local company remains the primary unit upon 
which dépends the existence of the industry. Yet local 
bargaining provides no common ground of poliey within 
which labor and management can bargain efficiently. So 
industry-wide bargaining is resorted to which, taken by 
itself, involves the danger of resorting to the other ex­
trême which fails to allow for local différences.
Collective bargaining, either at the local or in­
dustry-wide level, has proved too narrow to allow labor 
and management to formulate polieies directed in the end 
of the common good. The inévitable conclusion points to 
a framework for bargaining developed by a higher author- 
ity. This authority must have the power to develop a 
broad poliey concerning wages which would be applicable 
to ail businesses in général, rather than to a particular 
bargain. The Labor Committee of The Twentieth Century 
Fund recommends that
. . . the leaders of American industry and labor 
now jointly direct their attention, through the 
processes of self-government, to an agreed state- 
ment of économie principles which will afford a
48 Neil Chamberlain, The Union Challenge to Manage­
ment Control, New York, Harper & Bros., 19i+8, p. 257.
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basis for a constructive advance in understand- 
ing the wage-profit-price relationship in a dém­
ocratie system of compétitive private enterprise.n-9
This authority should develop standards based on de- 
sired national investment goals, standards that would guide 
the parties in their respective détermination of the col­
lective bargaining agreements. The bargaining groups would 
then have some guiaeposts to direct them. It (the author­
ity) should define the conditions which would legitimately 
allow régional, local, and national wage différentiels and 
thus encourage greater mobility of capital and labor. The 
most important contribution of such an authority should be 
a statement of the functions of management and a définition 
of labor*s area of interest in the industry or firm, in the 
control of the national économie well being. The organiza- 
tion should stand between the government and the individu­
al and give greater meaning and efficiency to industry-wide 
bargaining. The policies of the government, both économie 
and légal, provide a healthy environment for such an organ- 
ization or authority, but this type of organisation cannot 
be legislated into existence. It is the resuit of a grad­
uai development in the national industrial relations scene 
and in public opinion.
b9 Labor Committee of The Twentieth Century Fund, 
Partners in Production, A Basis of Labor-Management Under 




Historically speaking the trend toward industry- 
wide bargaining has been évident sinee the first develop- 
ments of collective bargaining. The ultimate goal of the 
union has been the standardization of wages and other con­
ditions of work, which may most profitably be achieved 
only through industry-wide bargaining. Until the labor 
movement firmly established itself on the American labor 
scene, with the help of a sympathetic national labor pol­
icy, its efforts were concentrated on union security.
Once security was achieved, organized labor could devote 
its full energies to securing industrial uniformity.
Industry-wide bargaining is most évident in indus­
tries characterized by high labor costs, easy entry into 
the field, and général industry instability. These indus­
tries are faced with problems which are not open to solu­
tion at the local level.
The interest in and trend toward industry-wide bar­
gaining is apparent in the général views of the parties 
most concerned. Some employers accept industry-wide bar­
gaining because it tends to equalize labor costs; while 
the unions* ambitions are toward standardization of wages 
and other conditions of work and to take labor out of 
compétition. Many labor economists hold that industry- 
wide bargaining is an effective device for stabilizing
an industry, promoting industrial peace, and contributing 
to the général économie welfare of the nation. The gov- 
ernment, through the N.L.R.B., holds that industry-wide 
units contribute to industrial relations stability and 
protect the rights of the union and the workers by giving 
them bargaining power equal to that of management.
Industry-wide bargaining is not of itself an effec­
tive means of industrial control. Collective-bargaining, 
by its very nature, is adjusted to the particular rather 
than the général. Industry-wide bargaining results in 
rigid rather than flexible bargains which may be adapted 
to the local level. An industry is usually made up of a 
number of firms, homogeneous to a certain degree, but he- 
terogeneous in many économie characteristics. It is the 
individual firm rather than the industry which is the pri- 
mary socio-democratic institution in our economy. And 
this hierarchy will continue until the firms are welded 
into one large trust or cartel. Just as industry-wide 
bargaining tends to impose rigidities on the individual 
firm, so it tends to transform the local union from a dy- 
namic institution into an administrative arm of the na­
tional union.
To modify and make more effective the workings of 
industry-wide bargaining, a tripartite authority should 
be established to develop a général framework within which 
bargaining negotiations can take place. The framework 
would direct the bargaining negotiations toward the common
Qk
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good. The authority should stand betvreen the government 
and the public, It must be the resuit of éducation and 
experience rather than of législation,
From an over-all point of view, the ultimate ef- 
fects of industry-wide bargaining will dépend on 
the question of whether management and labor will 
be able to accept as a working proposition the 
idea that there existe between them a community 
of interest as producers and an interdependence 
between them and other groupa in the général pop­
ulation which makes conflict more wasteful than 
coopération, Industry-wide bargaining can help 
in bringing these attitudes about and facilitâte 
their opération once they exist. It cannot be 
expected, however, to do the job ail by itself, 1
1 Otto L, Pollak, Social Implications of Induetry- 
Wide Bargaining, Philadelphla, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 19^ 8, p. 72.
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